I. INTRODUCTION

That the majority on occasion must be checked when proceeding against a minority of its fellow citizens is inevitable and probably salutary; but that the majority must be checked in proceedings against hostile aliens by a judge, simply because he doesn't think deportation is a good idea, is intolerable.
28
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2008 moderate pace and scope of reformng the securty certficate mechansm hnt at serous lmtatons of Charkaoui as far as the rghts of the detanees are concerned. Here, we scrutnze the decson for ts theoretcal underpnnngs, ts language, ts slences, and ts lmts. We ask why certan non-ctzens reman extremely vulnerable to harsh securty measures and show how rghtlessness perssts alongsde a robust commtment to human rghts.
In order to account for the complextes of mmgraton law and securty rhetorc ntersectng here, we use a multfaceted concepton of ctzenshp that dstngushes formal ctzenshp, effectve belongng, and supplementary sources of rghts clams. These dstnctons help to dentfy the specfic legal vulnerabltes of the Canadan securty certficate detanees. The Securty Certficate Fve do not hold Canadan passports and thus do not hold formal citizenship. In addton, they are seen as outsde the Canadan naton whose securty the government has to protect, thus lackng effective belonging. Fnally, the Securty Certficate Fve do not have other compelling rights claims arsng from ther ctzenshps to fall back upon. In fact, ther brth ctzenshps are sources of nsecurty rather than rghts. The conjuncton of these condtons renders the detanees vulnerable to rghtlessness understood as the nablty to enjoy the status of a person wth human rghts protectons as rights, not voluntary grants or concessons by poltcal authortes.
Charkaoui, we argue, does not acknowledge the vulnerabltes that become vsble through the lens of a multdmensonal account of ctzenshp. Instead, Charkaoui reterates the detanees' excluson from Canadan socety and explots ther legal and socal vulnerabltes. Charkaoui adds layers of procedural rghts to the securty certficate process n order to bolster the rule of law as procedural justce. Yet the rulng does lttle to address the underlyng substantve rghtlessness of those who are subject to securty certficates. The detanees are stll prmarly seen as threats, not bearers of rghts. Indeed, the addtonal procedural rghts appear as a "veneer of legalty" 15 maskng and legtmatng the explotaton of a more fundamental rghtlessness. Charkaoui thereby rases the queston of the relatonshp between the rule of law and the rghts of margnalzed people: can the rule of law empower those who are subject to the dscretonary practce of mmgraton law, or does t become "a formalstc deology deployed n support of natonal soveregnty" 16 n the context of mmgraton law? We proceed by provdng a bref overvew and crtcal analyss of the securty certficate process (II). We contnue wth a conceptual dscusson of dfferent dmensons of ctzenshp and rghtlessness, drawng upon Hannah Arendt's account of the fraglty of human rghts (III). The thrd part of the artcle shows how Charkaoui engages wth the detanees' specfic vulnerabltes that stem from ther lack of ctzenshp and belongng (IV).
II. DIsplaCINg INseCURITy: seCURITy CeRTIfICaTes IN CaNaDa
Securty certficates are used when nformaton surfaces ndcatng that a per-
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son who s lawfully present n Canada mght nevertheless be "nadmssble". Inadmssblty on securty grounds s stpulated n secton 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002) [IRPA] as follows:
(1) A permanent resdent or a foregn natonal s nadmssble on securty grounds for:
(a) engagng n an act of esponage or an act of subverson aganst a democratc government, nsttuton or process as they are understood n Canada;
(b) engagng n or nstgatng the subverson by force of any government;
(c) engagng n terrorsm;
(d) beng a danger to the securty of Canada;
(e) engagng n acts of volence that would or mght endanger the lves or safety of persons n Canada; or (f ) beng a member of an organzaton that there are reasonable grounds to beleve engages, has engaged or wll engage n acts referred to n paragraph (a), (b) or (c).
Securty certficates are ssued by the Mnster of Ctzenshp and Immgraton and the Mnster of Publc Safety on the advce of the Canadan Securty Intellgence Servce [CSIS] . Upon the sgnature by the mnsters, the certficate s automatcally referred to a desgnated Federal Court judge who has to assess the "reasonableness" of the certficate. 17 The reasonableness test asks the Federal Court judge to decde whether there are "reasonable grounds to beleve" that the evdence presented by the government establshes nadmssblty on securty grounds. The desgnated judge merely needs "a bona fide belef n a serous possblty based on credble evdence," whch s "more than a flmsy suspcon, but less than the cvl test of balance of probabltes." 18 The threshold s much lower than the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt requred by crmnal law.
Snce 1991, twenty-eght securty certficates have been ssued, twenty of whch were upheld. 19 Membershp n a terrorst organzaton 20 has been the most common reason for the ssuance of a securty certficate. Yet, three suspected spes from Russa and two members of Yasser Arafat's secret securty force were also deported under certficates. 21 Of the twenty-eght certficates, five have named women. The current detanees have been subject to detenton or subject to supervsed house arrest snce 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 , respectvely. They have been held on certficates for much longer than had been the custom pror to 9/11: n twelve out of the fifteen pre-9/11 cases, the persons named n the certficate were deported (occasonally to a thrd state) wthn two years; the large majorty of them wthn one year. Securty certficates were desgned to speed up the deportaton of non-ctzens who are nadmssble on securty grounds, and they largely accomplshed ths goal pror to 9/11. In current practce, however, they facltate ndefinte detenton nstead of speedy removal. Ths shft n the practcal applcaton of pre-exstng rules poses new moral and legal questons.
Under the old IRPA securty certficate process, the Mnster of Ctzenshp and Immgraton may present ex parte evdence to the Federal Court judge in camera (n secret) f the dsclosure of evdence to the ndvdual, ther legal counsel or the general publc could jeopardze natonal securty or the safety of any person. The desgnated judge revews the file prepared by CSIS whch may nclude evdence that would be nadmssble n crmnal proceedngs. 22 The judge provdes a summary of the evdence to the ndvdual named under a certficate to the extent that the nformaton may be dsclosed. Addtonally, IRPA guarantees the 'opportunty to be heard' for the ndvdual named to respond to the summary of evdence. Dependng on the nature of such a summary, ndvduals named n a securty certficate mght be unaware of the evdence presented aganst them and thus n no poston to counter t. Ths procedure has ganed the IRPA securty certficate process the nckname "secret trals" and caused consderable uneasness for partcpants n the process, ncludng some of the "desgnated judges". 23 The Charkaoui decson has nvaldated ths part of the IRPA as a volaton of the "fundamental justce" guarantee contaned n secton 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 24 but has suspended the effect of the nvaldaton untl February 23, 2008. Parlament s tasked wth devsng a new procedure that gves more weght to the detanees' rght to see and meet the case aganst them, and that provdes for an "ndependent agent at the stage of judcal revew" 25 to enable lmted advocacy on behalf of the detanees. Drafts and commttee delberatons ndcate that Parlament ntends to ntroduce the Brtsh specal advocate system wthout, however, gvng much weght to the crtcsms of ths system voced by specal advocates, Brtsh courts, and analysts.
How does the securty certficate process facltate potentally ndefinte detenton? The practcal effects of the securty certficate scheme result from the nteracton between legslatve framework, admnstratve practce, and
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Exploitation of Vulnerability 31 poltcal context. Frst, all non-resdents and most permanent resdents who are subject to a securty certficate are detaned. The detenton revew process before Charkaoui vared dependng on a person's resdence status n Canada: f the ndvdual named under the certficate s a permanent resdent of Canada, she s enttled to a revew of her case every sx months untl the certficate s ether found reasonable or quashed. At each revew, the person named n the certficate has the opportunty to present new evdence concernng the threat they pose to Canadan socety. Under the old framework, non-resdent foregn natonals were only enttled to a revew 120 days after the certficate has been found reasonable. In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court found ths dsparty of procedural rghts accordng to mmgraton status unjustfiable and mandated that all persons subject to securty certficates should have equal access to judcal revew of the reasonableness of ther detenton. 26 Second, f a securty certficate s upheld, the rulng mmedately becomes a deportaton order that s not subject to appeal. The final recourse s a Pre-Removal Rsk Assessment [PRRA] whch, f successful, classfies the ndvdual as a "person n need of protecton" and dsallows deportaton to the ndvdual's country of orgn 27 . Ths can be the case, for example, f the detanee would be at rsk of torture n ther country of ctzenshp. Under the Convention against Torture, states are not allowed to "expel, return ('refouler') or extradte a person to another State where there are substantal grounds for belevng that he would be n danger of beng subjected to torture." 28 Snce deportaton s the only opton envsoned n the securty certficate mechansm for ndvduals deemed 'dangerous', but s dsallowed by a dfferent body of law, those caught between the regmes of securty and mmgraton law and human rghts are subsequently left n detenton wth no specfic endpont n sght.
Ths dlemma s exacerbated by a pecularty n the Canadan Supreme Court jursprudence on deportaton and the rsk of torture. Whle the European Court of Human Rghts consders the prohbton on deportaton to torture to be absolute, 29 the Canadan Supreme Court opened a fateful gap n the guarantee of non-refoulement. In Suresh, 30 the Court dd not use the Convention against Torture but the Canadan Charter as the standard for decdng on whether a person found nadmssble to Canada under the securty certficate procedure could ever be returned to a country n whch they face torture. Unlke the Convention, the Charter permts balancng rghts aganst other legal goods. Judgng n the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Court decded "to balance Canada's nterest n combatng terrorsm and the Conventon refugee's nterest n not beng deported to torture," 31 and found that "to deport a refugee to face a substantal rsk of torture would generally" -but not always -volate the Charter. 32 Whle affirmng core lberal values, Suresh leaves room for unspecfied "exceptonal cases": "torture s so abhorrent that t wll almost always be dsproportonate to nterests on the other sde of the balance, even securty nterests." 33 What does Suresh mean for persons named n securty certficates? On the one hand, Suresh confirms that persons would generally not be deported f they mght face torture. Thus, speedy deportaton to states known to engage n torture becomes unlkely. On the other hand, Suresh establshes a lngerng possblty that someone may be deported n spte of the rsk of torture. Deportaton mght not be more than a theoretcal possblty, but t stll remans a possblty. As a consequence, the detenton and supervsed house arrest of those named n securty certficates can stll be construed as beng connected to the certficate's desgnated purpose of facltatng deportaton. The remote possblty of deportaton despte the rsk of torture establshes that the detanees are not conclusvely non-deportable and has provded the legal justficaton for Canadan mmgraton law's contnuous grp on them.
The nterplay between threat determnaton and the lmted commtment to non-deportaton can be observed n the case of Mahmoud Jaballah. He was first detaned on a securty certficate on 31 March, 1999. Ths certficate was quashed by a Federal Court n November 1999. In August 2001, Jaballah was arrested on a second securty certficate, whch was found to be reasonable n October 2006. 34 The Federal Court that confirmed the certficate also accepted that "f he [Jaballah] were to be removed to Egypt there s serous rsk that he would face torture, death or nhumane treatment." 35 No argument was made that Jaballah would be one of the "exceptonal cases" envsoned by Suresh. The Court found that Jaballah's "contnung presence n Canada, wthout restrants, would consttute a danger to the securty of the country."
36 Stll, the government may not "remove hm to any country where and when there s a substantal rsk that he would face torture, death, or cruel and unusual treatment." 37 Thus, Jaballah can nether be free n Canada nor be deported to Egypt, leavng contnued detenton as the "fallback" opton. Yet the detanees experence detenton not only as a repreve from deportaton, but also as a volaton of ther rghts n and of tself.
In February 2007, Charkaoui explctly encouraged Federal Courts to consder supervsed release as a less onerous alternatve to detenton. In Aprl 2007, a Federal Court judge was asked to decde whether Jaballah could be released on condtons. Ths decson upheld the ficton encouraged by Suresh that deportaton was stll consdered a possblty: "whle Mr. Jaballah's case s borderlne, there s nothng before me to suggest that the Mnsters have abandoned the ntenton to deport hm."
38 The government's mere intention -even n the absence 
Exploitation of Vulnerability 33 of reasonable prospects of success -to deport Jaballah s construed as sufficent for connectng restrctons on hs lbertes to the goal of deportaton. Ultmately, Jaballah s subjected to a regme of supervsed house arrest n whch hs famly members act as "suretes" and wardens who guarantee that he wll not engage n non-approved communcaton and actvtes. 39 Lke the detenton, the house arrest reles on the ficton that the government s stll tryng to deport the person named n a securty certficate. Were ths not the case, suggested Charkaoui, the restrctons on lberty would be unconsttutonal because they would be unrelated to mmgraton matters. The detanee's dangerousness alone can not be a vald reason for detenton, especally f only non-ctzens are subject to the scheme. Ths was the judgment of the Brtsh House of Lords n the Belmarsh 40 case. In Canada, then, the "Suresh excepton" makes all the dfference: the theoretcal possblty of deportaton despte the rsk of torture actvates a legal regme of ndefinte detenton and control that s exclusvely amed at non-ctzens.
We now turn from the overvew of the securty certficate scheme to a contextual analyss of the socal and legal vulnerabltes of the securty certficate detanees that helps to see why certan people are more lkely to be caught n a lmbo between detenton, supervsed house arrest, and the threat of deportaton to torture. The securty certficate detanees belong to a populaton that s vulnerable along several axes: they are perceved as culturally foregn and even threatenng to the country, they do not hold Canadan passports, and they have few other sources of rghts and protecton avalable to them. The confluence of these condtons fixes the specfic status of these detanees n a partcular zone of rghtlessness. Attenton to the multple axes of rghts and membershp clams helps us to poston the detanees n relatonshp to, for example, Canadan ctzens who were caught n the web of Canadan or U.S. ant-terrorsm polces.
III. VaRIeTIes Of CITIzeNshIp aND zONes Of RIghTlessNess
Ant-terrorsm polces n Canada, the UK, and the U.S. do not have unform effects on ndvduals: non-ctzens, persons wth dual ctzenshp n certan countres, Muslms and ethnc mnortes are most affected by ncreased survellance, preventve detenton, extraordnary rendton, and smlar polces. Ctzenshp has been marshalled as an explanaton for such vulnerabltes: nonctzens are more easly seen as carrers of volence, they are subject to the harsher regme of mmgraton law, and they cannot challenge ther treatment by partcpatng n electons and lobbyng elected officals. 41 Ctzenshp s often portrayed as a guarantor of rghts, for example n Hannah Arendt's account of the end of human rghts n The Origins of Totalitarianism. Here, we follow Arendt nsofar as we recognze ctzenshp as a key source of rghts n the context of ant-terrorsm polces. Yet we revst Arendt's analyss of ctzenshp and rghtlessness to allow for more nuances and dmensons wthn the concept of ctzenshp.
Arendt clams that human rghts are ted to effectve ctzenshp. The most fundamental rght, the "rght to have rghts," s to belong to a poltcal communty "wllng and able to guarantee any rghts whatsoever." 42 A poltcal communty, n turn, prmarly realzes and protects the rghts of ts members. The deprvaton of the "rght to have rghts" consttutes rghtlessness. It cuts much deeper than the denal of any specfic human rght. Rghtlessness hghlghts the dangers of not belongng: "the moment human bengs lacked ther own government and had to fall back upon ther mnmum rghts, no authorty was left to protect them and no nsttuton was wllng to guarantee them." 43 Instead of beng deprved of partcular rghts, people who are rghtless find themselves cast "out of legalty altogether." 44 Followng conceptualzatons of ctzenshp as dsaggregated and multdmensonal 45 whle buldng upon Arendt's account of rghtlessness, we dstngush three dmensons of membershp that can account for the dfferental treatment of dfferent groups of people subject to ant-terrorsm polces n the cases consdered here.
Although many people who are subject to detenton and house arrest under the ant-terrorsm schemes are ndeed not ctzens of the countres n whch they resde or are held, the formal ctzenshp represented by a passport s no nsurance aganst gettng caught n the transnatonal web of ant-terrorsm polces. For example, the Canadan government was long unconcerned about the fate of Canadan ctzen Maher Arar who had been "rendered" to Syra by U.S. authortes to be tortured. Arar holds not only a Canadan but also a Syran passport. Dual ctzenshp, far from bestowng dual prvleges, can undermne the assumptons of effectve belongng that are usually assocated wth holdng a country's passport. 46 Arar's dual ctzenshp hghlghts one context n whch the Canadan passport does not offer the needed protecton. Yet other Canadans who do not hold dual ctzenshp also complan about Canada's lack of nterest n protectng ther rghts: Omar Khadr has been detaned n Guantánamo Bay snce he was 15 years of age. The Khadr famly has experenced extreme levels of hostlty from the Canadan publc; and the government has long refused to make motons on Omar Khadr's behalf. 47 Khadr's ctzenshp has not provded much legal or rhetorcal tracton; Omar Khadr s treated as f he n fact does not belong to Canada. Hs "foregnness exceeds [hs] ctzenshp." 48 Khadr's case shows that not only dual ctzenshp but also cultural "foregnness" can undermne the degree of protecton that a passport holder can normally expect.
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These examples suffice to suggest that the practce of ctzenshp -Canadan ctzenshp, at least -s not monolthc. Rather, Canadan ctzenshp or ts absence can be broken down nto at least three dmensons that make a dfference to how persons who become suspect of terrorsm connectons are treated. Frst, there s a dmenson of ctzenshp understood as "effectve belongng," a "substantve ctzenshp" determnng the package of rghts and socal practces "that consttute the ndvdual as an actve, partcpatory, and functonal poltcal subject" 49 wthn Canada. The Khadr famly s not seen as effectvely belongng to Canada; and Maher Arar's "substantve ctzenshp" was only renstated after he was offically cleared of terrorsm suspcons. 50 Hannah Arendt's analyss of ctzenshp s not confined to matters of formal ctzenshp; t also llumnates the mportance of 'effectve belongng'. For Arendt, states are mportant because they are poltcal communtes. Naton-states offer a "socal texture" n whch persons "establshed for themselves a dstnct place n the world."
51 For Arendt, rghts can only be realzed through poltcal acton and nteracton. She therefore looks for a specfic "communty wllng and able to guarantee" 52 rghts. Ths poltcal communty, n turn, s consttuted by members whose collaboraton turns the abstract shell of the state nto "a place n the world whch makes opnons sgnficant and actons effectve."
53 Rghts can only be guaranteed through poltcal processes; and these processes are nurtured by an actve ctzenry. Ctzens guarantee rghts for those whom they recognze as fellow ctzens. In ths logc, the protecton of the "rghts of others" 54 outsde of the poltcal communty arses out of prncples of charty, not from a mutually shared percepton of effectve belongng. If rghts can only be guaranteed by poltcal communtes that are consttuted through ongong poltcal acton, we should expect that the substantve ctzenshp that consttutes membershp n ths poltcal communty does not always concde wth the formal ctzenshp of the country's passport holders. The fates of Maher Arar and Omar Khadr, among others, pont to ths gap between substantve and formal membershp n Canada.
Second, "formal ctzenshp" or "passport ctzenshp" refers to those who hold a country's passport. 55 Formal ctzenshp delneates a person's legal relatonshp to a state and forms the bass for a package of enttlements and expectatons of protecton. These expectatons mght reman unfulfilled, as n the cases of persons who are seen to lack "substantve ctzenshp" and treated wth less concern and respect than other passport holders. Yet n many countres ncludng Canada, formal ctzenshp establshes a set of mnmum enttlements -for example, the rght to vote n natonal electons as well as the rght to enter and reman n the country -that persons who do not hold formal ctzenshp cannot clam.
Thrd, the qualty of one's ctzenshp (or lack thereof ) s shaped by member- shp and rghts clams n other jursdctons. 56 Most people are ctzens of at least one state, but many of these ctzenshps do not offer effectve protecton as some states renounce or persecute some of ther ctzens. Hannah Arendt estmated n 1951 that the ten mllon de facto stateless persons of her tme -those who held passports but dd not effectvely belong to the poltcal communty that ssued these passports -would easly outnumber the one mllon de jure stateless persons who do not hold passports at all. 57 Moreover, the qualty of one's ctzenshp transcends borders. As Arendt noted, "treates of recprocty and nternatonal agreements have woven a web around the earth that makes t possble for the ctzen of every country to take hs legal status wth hm."
58 Some passports mply promses of protecton beyond state borders, whle other passports shown at certan borders are more lkely to rase suspcons about ther bearers and ther motves. 59 Someone holdng a Canadan passport, for example, mght find that her ctzenshp n another country stll shapes her legal and socal poston: she can be seen as a model of desrable transnatonalsm, or alternatvely as an unrelable and not fully commtted ctzen or a potental carrer of the "bad transnatonalsm" of deologcal fanatcsm. For Maher Arar, for example, dual ctzenshp was decsve, but not to hs advantage: nstead, hs Syran ctzenshp gave currency to the cyncal clam that he was merely sent "home" to Syra. For those who are not ctzens of the country they lve n, the qualty of ther rghts clams also depends on the passports they hold: dependng on ther country of ctzenshp, they mght ether have recourse to effectve dplomatc protecton, or fear to return "home", and/or be subject to extensve scrutny durng nternatonal travel. The qualty of non-ctzens' rghts and membershp clams n one country depends, among other thngs, on the qualty and effectveness of ther ctzenshp elsewhere.
Internatonal human rghts can offer another source of rghts clams outsde of one's state of resdence. In the UK, the gap between the treatment of ctzens and non-ctzens n the context of ant-terrorsm polces has been largely closed through the nvocaton of the European Conventon on Human Rghts as bndng law. 60 Whle human rghts do not establsh a layer of meanngful world ctzenshp or "sphere … above the natons," as Arendt warned, 61 they should be taken nto account n analyzng the shape of rghts clams n contemporary socetes.
If ctzenshp s a form of membershp that gves access to rghts and prvleges, the lack of ctzenshp -statelessness -results n rghtlessness. Ths was the concluson that Hannah Arendt drew from the collapse of the nterwar system of naton-states n Europe. 
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Exploitation of Vulnerability 37 suggests, end ponts on a contnuum rather than ether/or propostons, 63 we should pay more attenton to the multfaceted combnatons between dfferent forms and degrees of ctzenshp and ther effects on rghts clams. The "substance of ctzenshp" or ts absence as experenced by ndvduals can be understood as a "composte of the elements of membershp wthn and between all states to whch the ndvdual s connected."
64 Rghtlessness, statelessness, and effectve ctzenshp are used here to ndcate extreme ponts n a complcated landscape of rghts and membershp and to dstngush dfferent qualtes of ctzenshp as well as forms of rghtlessness.
IV. Charkaoui: DEALINg IN RIghTLESSNESS
The securty certficate detanees largely lack the three dmensons of ctzenshp that would enable ther rghts clams to resonate wth the Canadan publc and the legal system. They are mostly perceved as foregn and threatenng, outsde of the realm of effectve belongng. They are not Canadan ctzens and therefore outsde of the realm of full legal protecton under Canadan laws. And they cannot rely on the protecton of ther countres of ctzenshp for any other rghts clams. To the contrary, ther formal ctzenshp becomes a lablty because t rases the threat of deportaton to torture. How does Charkaoui deal wth these vulnerabltes? In the remander of ths artcle, we show that the Charkaoui rulng explots each of these sources of rghtlessness wthout fully acknowledgng ther effects on the status and experences of the detanees. In short, Charkaoui presumes that the detanees effectvely do not belong to the Canadan demos, t stresses the prvleges of formal ctzenshp n order to counter allegatons of dscrmnaton aganst non-ctzens, and t fals to recognze the detanees' lack of optons for ext due to ther lack of effectve ctzenshp elsewhere.
A. Our Security, Their Insecurity: Effective Belonging
How does Charkaoui map the place of the detanees n relatonshp to the "magned communty" 65 of Canada? Although Charkaoui gestures towards the humanty and ndvdualty of the securty certficate detanees, the Court sees them as fundamentally alen to Canada. Not only do they not belong to the naton whose securty s encompassed by the ubqutous term "natonal securty" -even worse, the detanees are deemed to threaten ths, "our" securty. They are postoned as clearly dstngushable from Canadan socety, as rreducbly alen. The legal remedes suggested by the Court barely conceal ths abyss.
Analyses of prevous securty certficate decsons have noted that the Federal Courts have reled on "profiles" of terrorsts based on travel patterns and deology. Once a person s matched wth a "profile", they have lttle room for dsputng ther desgnaton as dangerous to Canadan securty. 66 On a more funda- ). 66 Sherene Razack, "'Your clent has a profile': Race and Natonal Securty n Canada after 9/11" mental level, the language of process, law, evdence and nnocence obscures the nature of the accusatons at the heart of the certficates: securty certficates can be ssued for people who are members of organzatons that might engage n terrorsm n the future. 67 Thus, the certficate s to a sgnficant degree based on predctons of future conduct and on assessments of nner dspostons that mght not have surfaced n materal actons. But how s a person to prove that they wll not engage n terrorsm? Gven the folk knowledge voced n court rooms that terrorsm s connected to certan Islamc fundamentalst deologes that are acqured or nourshed by vsts to "the regon", and that someone "hooked" on these deologes wll reman commtted to them, 68 t s llusonary to expect someone who fits the terrorst profile to be able to prove that they are not dangerous. The speculatve questons about a person's lkely future assocatons, actons, and commtments have to be assessed by the Federal Court wth the low standard of "reasonable grounds to beleve" that favours the government's characterzaton of the case. The setup of the securty certficate process encourages the translaton of socetal threat perceptons nto legal excluson orders.
In contemporary naton-states, the "magned communty" of the naton usually extends only to fellow ctzens or natonals. The shape of the Canadan magned communty, expressed and shaped through nsttutonalzed polces of multculturalsm and blngualsm, s elusve and wdely debated. 69 What t means to be Canadan s rarely explctly attrbuted to mmutable characterstcs such as ethncty, common language or shared hstory. Canadan-ness s most often descrbed n terms of commonalty n belefs (n dversty, tolerance and lberalsm) underlned by the assumpton of (at least) resdency and famly tes n Canada. These belefs, n turn, are more readly attrbuted to some demographc groups and more easly dsputed for other groups. The culturally domnant or "orgnal ctzens" 70 who derve ther ctzenshp from ancestry and membershp n a major cultural and language group have a firmer socal standng than those who are relatve "newcomers" and members of mnorty language and cultural groups. The Canadan National Security Policy, for example, begns by definng Canadan-ness by the moral (as opposed to legal or geographc) boundares of the country. The "Canadan" of the National Security Policy s defined not by ctzenshp but through reference to Canadan values:
Canadans stand together n reaffirmng that the use of volence to pursue poltcal, relgous or deologcal goals s an affront to our values… No one better apprecates the need
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Exploitation of Vulnerability 39 to protect our socety than those who chose ths country as a place to buld a better lfe or who fled the consequences of nstablty and ntolerance n other parts of the world. 71 Some mmgrants, and n partcularly those who "chose" Canada for themselves, are readly embraced n the Canadan demos. Yet, "somewhere between the people who 'chose' Canada and the homogenous 'Canadans' opposed to volence, s the nserton of some non-Canadan 'other' (n a legal or natonal sense)." 72 The "foregnness" of those whose alleged values do not fit the National Security Policy's vson of Canadan-ness s not a gven fact.
73 Rather, t s establshed through ths polcy and other government pronouncements. Foregnness, as Bonne Hong puts t, s "a symbolc marker that the naton attaches to the people we want to dsavow, deport, or detan because we experence them as a threat."
74 It s therefore not reducble to the lack of formal ctzenshp. In the context of terrorsm threats, foregnness becomes an attrbute of the threat as well as of persons assocated wth the threat.
In Charkaoui, the detanees' foregnness s presumed and affirmed from the openng paragraph on. The judgment stuates tself by descrbng "a tenson that les at the heart of modern democratc governance":
One of the most fundamental responsbltes of a government s to ensure the security of its citizens. Ths may requre t to act on nformaton that t cannot dsclose and to detain people who threaten national security. Yet n a consttutonal democracy, governments must act accountably and n conformty wth the Consttuton and the rghts and lbertes t guarantees. 75 The government's mandate s to ensure the securty of "ts ctzens" and to "detan people who threaten natonal securty." These two groups presumably do not overlap: people who threaten natonal securty are not part of the naton to be secured. The "ctzens" are dfferent from the "people who threaten natonal securty" whom the government "may" be requred to detan. "People who threaten natonal securty" are mplctly assocated wth foregnness through contrastng them wth "ctzens". In framng the case as a balancng act between lberty and securty, the Court sldes towards balancng the ctzens' securty aganst the lberty (and securty) of the detanees ("people who threaten natonal securty"), keepng the desres and nterests of these two groups strctly separated. Charkaoui does not contemplate, for example, that people who appear suspect share everyone else's vulnerablty to acts of volence; or that "ctzens" as well as non-ctzens mght see ther personal securty threatened by ant-terrorsm polces. Such consderatons could have helped to blur the lne between the stpulated nterests of the ctzens and the "others".
Charkaoui dscusses the lberty and securty nterests of the detanees separately from natonal securty. The detanees' securty concerns receve attenton because they evoke the case of Maher Arar, a Canadan wrongly accused of terrorsm and 'rendered' to Syra by U.S. authortes wth the complcty of Canadan authortes. The Court recognzes the "potental consequences of deportaton combned wth allegatons of terrorsm." 76 The lsted negatve consequences of beng labelled a terrorst n a securty certficate procedure are all produced by courts or government nsttutons. The certficate process mght "lead to removal from Canada, to a place where hs or her lfe or freedom would be threatened," lead to the more general "accusaton that one s a terrorst, whch could cause rreparable harm to the ndvdual," especally n the case of beng deported to one's home country. Fnally, a securty certficate deprves a person of the protecton from deportaton to torture. 77 The Court's answer to these grave threats to the detanees' well-beng s to mandate a more thorough revew process. Ths process ams to decrease the lkelhood of falsely labellng people as terrorsts, but would not change the stuaton of someone rghtfully found to be a securty rsk: they could stll be sent "to a place where hs or her lfe or freedom would be threatened." In ths case, rghts and protectons are scaled accordng to a person's asserted rsk to natonal securty.
In mandatng a more thorough and searchng revew of the securty certficates, the Court places much rhetorcal weght on the judges' unease wth the deficent current process. Judges who were nvolved n the securty certficate process complaned that the ntroducton of evdence unavalable to the detanee skewed the adversaral process to a degree that they felt "a lttle bt lke a fig  leaf. " 78 In descrbng the deficences of the process, the court reles on the mage of the judge who tres to "engage n a searchng revew" 79 of the record but mght nevertheless mss relevant facts that would have emerged n a more open settng and therefore fal n the judcal aspraton to do justce. The casualty of justce s not descrbed from the detanees' pont of vew, but from the perspectve of the judges who "have worked assduously to overcome the dfficultes nherent n the role the IRPA has assgned to them." 80 We see heroc judges tryng to save the rule of law rather than the rghts of the detanees as such:
The farness of the IRPA procedure rests entrely on the shoulders of the desgnated judge. Those shoulders cannot
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by themselves bear the heavy burden of assurng, n fact and appearance, that the decson on the reasonableness of the certficate s mpartal, s based on a full vew of the facts and law, and reflects the named person's knowledge of the case to meet. The judge, workng under the constrants mposed by the IRPA, smply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the tradtonal guarantees of a far hearng. 81 In ths account, the humanty, compasson and sufferng of the judges -arsng from the mperfectons of the process -are afforded more vsblty than the rghts volatons, despar and uncertanty suffered by the detanees. The Court's rhetorc suggests that the procedure needs to be revamped prmarly because the judges are unable to fulfil ther role of delverng justce, and only secondarly because the resultng decsons volate the detanees' Charter rghts. The Court's proposals for remedes reflect ths prorty: The Court recommends, among other optons, the Brtsh specal advocate system that grants a lawyer wth securty clearance access to the prvleged documents. 82 Ths system stands good chances of beng mplemented by Parlament, and t stands equally good chances of beng challenged as procedurally nsufficent and unconsttutonal by human rghts and legal advocacy organzatons. 83 In ts orgnal Brtsh form, the specal advocate s not allowed to consult wth the detanee after seeng the evdence. As a result, the detanee does not know the case to respond to, and the specal advocate knows the government nformaton but has ncomplete access to the detanee's knowledge about the events alleged n the government's dosser. These mperfectons, however, apparently do not matter for the purpose of decdng Charkaoui: the Court acknowledges that the proposed system "may not be perfect from the named person's perspectve," 84 but Parlament has the ultmate say n these matters and s "not requred to use the perfect, or least restrctve, alternatve" to the current process. 85 The alternatve process to be drawn up by Parlament mght ease the burden of judgment on the shoulders of the judges wthout necessarly satsfyng the nterests of the detanees.
The Court's dscusson of addtonal procedural safeguards decentres the detanees' rghts and focuses on the self-percepton of the judcal system as a guar- antor of mpartalty and the rule of law. Addng procedural safeguards does not guarantee a better rghts protecton for the detanees for at least two reasons. Frst, the addtonal procedural mechansms may smply be nsufficent to create a far process; they mght add up to no more than a "thn veneer of legalty" 86 barely concealng the executve-domnated character of the securty certficate process. Second, even a thcker set of procedural protectons mght turn out to be a veneer maskng the logcal near-mpossblty of dsprovng "reasonable suspcon" of one's dangerousness 87 -especally f dangerousness s culturally coded to concde wth the relgous and ethnc denttes that one s seen to nhabt. In ths case, the process satsfies socety's self-percepton as commtted to the rule of law wthout addressng the underlyng exclusons that make some people easy targets for securty certficates and rghtlessness.
B. Citizens, Residents, Foreign Nationals: Formal Citizenship
Charkaoui engages wth the formal meanng of ctzenshp by affirmng that non-ctzens suspected of beng threats to natonal securty are subject to a legal framework that ctzens are never subject to: mmgraton law. By nsstng that Charkaoui s an mmgraton matter, the Court evades arguments about the unequal treatment of ctzens and non-ctzens n terrorsm-related matters. In addton, the Court asks Parlament to devse a new securty certficate procedure. Yet democratc nsttutons are often complct n establshng dfferent sets of rghts for ctzens and non-ctzens because only ctzens' nterests are systematcally (though mperfectly) represented n such bodes.
Charkaoui hghlghts the dstncton between ctzens and non-ctzens by dsallowng comparsons between the treatment of ctzen terrorsm suspects and the non-ctzen securty certficate detanees. The treatment of the non-ctzen terrorsm suspects rases the queston of dscrmnaton snce Canadan ctzens, rrespectve of ther dangerousness or ntenton to engage n terrorsm, cannot be detaned unless as part of crmnal proceedngs aganst them. Dscrmnaton, however, presumes that two groups of persons who share relevant characterstcs are treated unequally on the bass of rrelevant trats. The Court found that the securty certficate process does not consttute dscrmnaton because the moblty and resdence rghts of s. 6 of the Charter "specfically allow… for dfferental treatment of ctzens and non-ctzens n deportaton matters: only ctzens are accorded the rght to enter, reman n and leave Canada." 88 The dscrmnaton framework s unavalable as long as the case s treated as a deportaton matter. The Court, relyng on the Suresh excepton that renders deportaton never completely mpossble, found that "the record on whch we must rely does not establsh that the detentons at ssue have become unhnged from the state's purpose of deportaton."
89 Indeed, the avalablty of an ongong "effectve revew process that permts the judge to consder all matters relevant to the detenton" ensures
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Exploitation of Vulnerability 43 that detenton wll contnue only as long as t s connected to deportaton. 90 The procedural justce of ongong revew brngs the detenton closer to the prncples of the rule of law and thereby normalzes t. 91 Yet t slences the underlyng questons about the nature and effects of the detenton that depend on the substantve rghtlessness of the crcumscrbed group of non-ctzens.
The Court rases two allegedly hypothetcal constellatons n whch the securty certficate detenton scheme mght be dscrmnatory: "[f ]rst, detenton may become ndefinte as deportaton s put off or becomes mpossble, for example because there s no country to whch the person can be deported."
92 Ths stuaton, however, s already present: the five men have been held for prolonged perods of tme. In the case of Mahmoud Jaballah, deportaton to Egypt was specfically prohbted by a Federal Court. It s not clear, then, how hs contnued detenton and supervsed release are meanngfully connected to the attempt to deport hm, let alone deport hm speedly. The ndefinte character of ths detenton and survellance s not seen by the courts.
The logc of Charkaoui hnges on the dstncton between, on the one hand, "lengthy and ndetermnate" detenton, whch s conceded for the cases at hand, 93 and, on the other hand, "ndefinte detenton", whch s unconsttutonal and allegedly not present n the current cases. Charkaoui affirms that "the IRPA … does not authorze ndefinte detenton." 94 Ths statement s only plausble f "ndefinte" s read to mean "endless", not f t means "lastng for an unknown or unstated length of tme." The latter, however, s the Oxford English Dictionary's definton of "ndefinte."
95 If the court had taken ths definton of the term as ts pont of departure, t could have conceded that the combnaton of mmgraton legslaton, admnstratve practce, and the protecton aganst torture have created a constellaton of ndefinte mmgraton detenton n Canada. By usng a partcular understandng of "ndefinte" and nsstng on the theoretcal possblty of deportaton even n the absence of strong evdence of governmental wll or feasblty, Charkaoui upholds the ficton that securty certficate detenton s "lengthy" 96 but not "ndefinte." These fine dstnctons were lost on some commentators: a Globe & Mail edtoral summarzed Charkaoui as rulng that "the ndefinte jalng of non-ctzens suspected of beng terrorsts s legtmate, as long as ther detenton s subject to meanngful and regular revew."
97 Ths s decdedly not what the Court ntended to say, but the edtoral mght unwttngly have provded a perceptve account of the decson's effects.
The Court envsoned a second case n whch, potentally, the detenton would be unconsttutonal: "the government could concevably use the IRPA not for Ths scenaro can also be seen as a descrpton of the current stuaton. After all, securty and mmgraton have become ntertwned as polcy matters n the post-9/11 perod. The Court started the Charkaoui judgment wth a medtaton on the tenson between securty and lberty, not a dscusson of mmgraton law. The deportatons that are ostensbly sought are not very lkely to materalze. Ultmately, none of the persons named by a securty certficate who fit the "profile" of a transnatonal Islamc terrorst have been deported after 9/11. Detenton on securty grounds s at least a convenent sde effect, f not the ntended goal of the current admnstratve practce of ssung securty certficates.
The Court's nsstence that IRPA does not allow ndefinte detenton helps t to dstngush the Canadan cases from the Brtsh Belmarsh 99 case that spells out a dfferent understandng of the meanng and prvleges of formal ctzenshp. Intally, the Brtsh post-9/11 detenton scheme resembled the Canadan securty certficates: upon certficaton, non-ctzen terrorsm suspects could be held pendng deportaton. Some of the detanees held n the Belmarsh prson turned out to be non-deportable because Brtsh jursprudence ncorporates the strct prohbton on deportaton to torture developed by the European Court of Human Rghts n Chahal.
100 They complaned that they were dscrmnated aganst on grounds of natonalty and mmgraton status: terrorsm suspects who are UK natonals would ether be free or subject to crmnal proceedngs, and deportable non-ctzens could leave or would be deported. The Law Lords scrutnzed the detenton scheme more crtcally than the Canadan Supreme Court dd n Charkaoui. The Lords followed the appellants' suggeston of comparng the treatment of terrorsm suspects who are UK ctzens and non-ctzens. They consequently refused "to accept the correctness of the Secretary of State's choce of mmgraton control as a means to address the Al-Qaeda securty problem, when the correctness of that choce s the ssue to be resolved." 101 The Lords rased a number of pragmatc questons about the approprateness of mmgraton measures to address terrorsm threats: the provsons are not narrowly targeted at persons who support volence; 102 and offerng "a suspected nternatonal terrorst" to leave the UK to "perhaps a country as close as France" would be "hard to reconcle wth a belef n hs capacty to nflct serous njury to the people and nterests of ths country." 103 In addton, the threat posed by UK ctzen terrorsm suspects s not addressed. In short, the provsons attacked n the Belmarsh case encompass persons who pose no actual threat, leave out others who would be threats, and provde a remedy that s strkngly ll-suted to the problem that should be addressed.
The House of Lords dd not examne the detenton scheme as an mmgraton matter: on the one hand, deportaton was concededly mpossble n the 98 Charkaoui, supra note 2 at para. 130. 99 Secretary of State, supra note 4.
Exploitation of Vulnerability 45 cases at hand. And on the other hand, the Lords dd not dentfy terrorsm as a problem exclusvely attached to non-ctzens. Evdence before the Court suggested that almost 30% of the suspects detaned under the Terrorism Act were Brtsh ctzens. 104 The London Subway bombngs of July 2005, sx months after the Belmarsh decson was handed down, were commtted by Brtsh ctzens. 105 The bombngs renforced the prevalent majorty mstrust of mmgrants and Muslms. For Brtsh courts and socety, terrorsm does not necessarly come from abroad, but from formal ctzens who nevertheless lack crucal markers of "Brtshness." Ths logc s not less exclusonary than the reasonng behnd Charkaoui, but t draws the lne elsewhere. 106 The House of Lords approached the case as a securty matter that the government chose to address through mmgraton law. The Lords found that "the appellants were treated dfferently from both suspected nternatonal terrorsts who were not UK natonals and could be removed and also from nternatonal terrorsts who were UK natonals and could not be removed." 107 Ther treatment consttutes dscrmnaton on the bass of natonalty and mmgraton status, prohbted under Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
There are two reasons why the Canadan Supreme Court n Charkaoui (as well as a Federal Court n Almrei, 108 decded n 2005) could have reled on the standards developed n the Belmarsh case and yet have not found the Canadan securty certficate scheme dscrmnatory. 109 Frst, the Canadan legal constellaton snce Suresh makes t possble to clam a connecton between detenton and deportaton. The detenton thus appears lengthy but not "ndefinte." In Almrei, decded n February 2005, a Federal Court reasoned: "In the House of Lords' decson, the legal mpossblty of deportng to torture the persons arrested made the detenton ndefinte. In our jursdcton, at ths moment, deportaton to torture remans a possblty and, therefore, each case wll have to be assessed on ts own merts." 110 In addton, terrorsm s perceved as an exclusvely foregn problem that s accordngly ratonally addressed through mmgraton law: "There s no evdence, as there was n the Englsh case, of a szeable number of Canadan natonals beng suspected of nternatonal terrorsm whose detenton would be requred and yet not pursued and effected." 111 Whle the Almrei Court refused to compare non-ctzen and ctzen terrorsm suspects because the latter category seemed empty, the Supreme Court n Charkaoui retreated to the more formal poston that ctzens and non-ctzens cannot be compared n deportaton matters because they have legtmately varyng moblty rghts.
The Almrei poston of seeng Canadans as categorcally non-dangerous had become unsustanable snce the eghteen suspects arrested n summer 2006 for nvolvement n a plot to bomb targets n Ontaro ncludng Parlament Hll were all Canadan ctzens. 112 In response to the arrests, a representatve of the CSIS assured the publc that "ths operaton n no way reflects negatvely on any specfic communty or ethnocultural group n Canada," but hs broader message questoned the separaton between ctzens and non-ctzen terrorsm suspects: "Terrorsm s a dangerous deology, and a global phenomenon. As yesterday's arrests demonstrate, Canada s not mmune from ths deology." 113 Yet even f Canadan ctzenshp s not seen to rule out a person's nvolvement n terrorsm, t stll nsulates them from some of the most repressve tools n the government's arsenal of ant-terrorsm polces.
Whle Canadan ant-terrorsm polces rely on a sharp dstncton between holders of Canadan passports and everyone else, the Brtsh polces de-emphasze formal ctzenshp n favour of substantve ctzenshp. The Belmarsh decson that struck down the detenton scheme based on mmgraton law was soon followed by a scheme of "control orders" that subject persons, deemed threats to Brtsh securty, to condtons ncludng house arrest, surrender of dentficaton documents and passports, prohbtons on enterng or leavng certan areas, and prohbtons on arranged meetngs and unsupervsed communcaton, to be specfied by the mposng authorty. 114 These orders can, and have been, ssued aganst both ctzens and non-ctzens. They are vald for one year, are renewable, and can only be ssued f crmnal prosecutons are not feasble. Courts have found some partcularly restrctve control orders n volaton of human rghts, but a stream of jursprudence has stablzed and normalzed the practce of control orders and heghtened survellance aganst groups of people who have been determned to be dangerous but who cannot be prosecuted. 115 Although the control orders do not dscrmnate between ctzens and non-ctzens, they contnue to target persons who are perceved as foregn through ther tes to Islamc groups. Here, new magnares of ctzenshp and foregnness are moblzed to draw a dfferent lne between those whose securty s to be protected and those who pose securty rsks. The lne no longer follows formal ctzenshp, and mmgraton law therefore becomes a useless tool for markng t. 116 Yet the underlyng logc s no less exclusonary.
Some Canadan commentators prased the Charkaoui's relance on formal ctzenshp wth a sde glance at the Belmarsh decson and ts effects. An edtoral n the Globe & Mail, for example, ponts to the negatve example of
V. CONCLUSION
The Charkaoui rulng s an attempt to assmlate ant-terrorsm polces to the rule of law. Yet the decson explots rather than acknowledges the vulnerabltes of the people for whom beng subject to securty certficates means ndefinte detenton. The treatment of the non-ctzens who are subject to securty certficates does not hnge on ther gult or nnocence as establshed n legal proceedngs. Instead, securty certficates are based on assessments of dangerousness. Dangerousness, n turn, s establshed on the bass of untested evdence and assumptons about future behavour and assocatons. Persons who are subject to securty certficates are judged accordng to what they are alleged to be (dangerous or not), rather than accordng to what they did. Yet the securty certficate process s often descrbed n terms borrowed from crmnal law n ways that suggest suspcons about specfic ndvdual culpablty that are n fact absent n these cases. Even the crtcsm of "secret trals" fals to capture that the proceedngs, however deficent they mght be, do not adjudcate gult or nnocence and do not amount to trals at all. The conjuncton of rghtlessness and the rrelevance of legal nnocence n ths context leads us back to consder Arendt's observaton on the treatment of stateless people n nterwar Europe: "Jursts are so used to thnkng of law n terms of punshment, whch ndeed always deprves us of certan rghts, that they may find t even more dfficult than the layman to recognze that the deprvaton of legalty, i.e. of all rghts, no longer has a connecton wth specfic crmes." 129 The aspraton to beng "judged by one's actons and opnons," 130 n turn, can only be fulfilled f one belongs to a poltcal communty that recognzes one's dstnctveness and humanty, Arendt concluded. Securty certficates do not adjudcate gult or nnocence n relatonshp to specfic crmes, but a person's abstract dangerousness based on ther "profile."
Securty certficates explot the rghtlessness of some non-ctzens by subjectng them to a process n whch not ther actons and opnons but ther physcal appearance, place of brth, and formal ctzenshp determne ther fate. The Securty Certficate Fve are non-ctzens of Canada who share addtonal vulnerabltes: they are perceved as alen and threatenng to the natonal communty, and ther ctzenshps n Algera, Morocco, Syra and Egypt operate as further labltes rather than supplementary sources of rghts. The Supreme Court's response to the detanees' clams adopted the language of consttutonal rghts rather than human rghts. It addressed some concerns but upheld the fundamental dstncton between ctzens and non-ctzens n the context of ant-terrorsm polces.
Snce the detanees' partcular form of rghtlessness results from a combnaton of ther lack of formal ctzenshp, lack of effectve belongng and the qualty of ther ctzenshps elsewhere, attempts to nclude them (and others) wthn the framework of ordnary legalty need to pay attenton to the ntersectng sources of rghtlessness. A proposal to follow the Law Lords' reasonng that ctzens and non-ctzens cannot be treated dfferently n ant-terrorsm polces, for example,
